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Abstract. This paper deals with the assessment of Safety Management Systems performance and 
presents a new tool developed for that purpose. It recognizes two dimensions in a SMS: a structural 
facet corresponding to the formal description of the system and an operational one focused on the 
system’s influence on the working environment and practices of people. Building up the operational 
performance of a SMS actually strengthens the overall resilience of the organization. Authors of the 
paper believes that the operational performance of SMS can be measured using Tripod Delta. This 
method is actually designed to detect weak areas in the environment in which people are working and 
the level of control that the organization has on it. The method and its interesting model of organiza-
tional resilience are presented in the paper. In the framework of this paper, Tripod is used as an input 
to measure the SMS operational performance. Both of the tools designed to measure the structural 
and operational performances of Safety Management Systems are then described.  
1  PERFORMANCE OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Many companies are implementing a Safety Management System in order to manage 
health and safety in the workplace in a more coherent and more effective way. This 
“emerging” mode of managing safety mainly comes from the growing need for a global 
and structured approach of risk management. Despite the several benefits of its imple-
mentation, experience show that companies sometimes fail to implement an effective 
SMS. As shown by Favaro (Favaro, 2005) and Drais (Drais, 2005), if special care is not 
taken when SMS is designed and formalized, the system can end up being quite superfi-
cial, disconnected from real work situations, be poorly dynamic and can also introduce 
additional constraints for workers or rigidity in the way the safety is managed in the 
company. In other words, the system is more likely to go against workers if the inherent 
prescriptive and normative tendencies of the SMS are not well managed when the sys-
tem is designed and implemented. 
Avoiding such shortcomings in the system inevitably includes the acknowledgement of 
two dimensions in the Safety Management System: a ‘structural’ dimension and an ‘op-
erational’ dimension.  
1.1 The ‘structural’ and ‘operational’ dimensions of a SMS 
The ‘structural’ facet of the SMS can be defined as the formal description of all the ef-
forts that are made by the company into managing health and safety at the workplace. 
These efforts can be categorized into several Safety Management Processes (i.e. sec-
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tions or chapters in safety management standards) such as the definition of an Occupa-
tional Health and Safety (OH&S) policy, an OH&S program, implementation of a 
communication or documentation system, hazard identification, etc. Each of these 
Safety Management Processes (SMPs) implies policies, rules, procedures, guidelines, 
working instructions, techniques or methods, etc. that the company has internally estab-
lished to manage safety. These rules, procedures, techniques, etc. are the formal an-
swers to the good practices (and legal requirements) emanating from safety manage-
ment standards, from the company standards, from the branch specifications, etc. This 
prescribed system gives an image of how the safety management system works on “pa-
per”. 
However, things can be perfectly organized on paper, but can not work in “real life”. It 
seems then necessary to analyze how things are done in addition to how things are for-
malized. This aspect refers to the ‘operational’ facet of Safety Management Systems. 
Alongside their formal description, the efforts made by the company in the safety man-
agement need to be implemented and integrated throughout the company until the 
‘sharp end’. The way these efforts or actions are integrated within the practices of the 
company and its members is of concern here. This time, the scope of analysis concerns 
the influence of the efforts that the company has put into managing safety of peoples’ 
activities at the workplace. It is considered that a SMS is actually ‘operationally’ work-
ing if the different SMPs are integrated within the practices and if they positively influ-
ence the working conditions of people. The operational facet of a SMS is of course the 
most important one in terms of safety. One can agree that safety practices shared by 
everybody in the company, well integrated within the practices and influencing posi-
tively the working environment have a higher impact on the overall safety state of a 
company than a well-formalized, well-structured or well-described management system.  
With respect to these two dimensions, the global performance of a Safety Management 
System can be assessed according to its structural and an operational performance (Fig-
ure 1). Structural performance can be defined as the level of compliance of the internal 
processes (SMPs) as established by the company (under the forms of procedures, in-
structions, policies, techniques, tools, etc.) with the existing safety management stan-
dards. This performance, generally aimed at the accreditation of the SMS put into place 
by the company, is measured with structural indicators (e.g. has the company estab-
lished a procedure regarding its training program? is the procedure updated? vali-
dated?). Operational performance can be described as the level of integration and of in-
fluence of these formal processes on the practices and the working environment of peo-
ple. Examples of operational performance indicators could be: Do the personnel feel 
that they are correctly trained? Are trainings adapted to the level or the job of people? 
Are the personnel able to put in practice the theoretical courses? Are there sufficiently 
trained and qualified people in each team? Etc.  
Operational performance is then more focused on what the management system does 
rather than on what it has (this matter is tackled in the structural performance) and is 
clearly considered as the intrinsic value of a safety management system. Building up the 
operational performance of a management system strengthens the overall resilience of 
the organization. 
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Fig.1. Global performance of safety management systems 
1.2 Main approaches currently available for measuring SMS performance and the 
proposed approach to measure SMS performance 
Three main approaches are currently available to measure performance of safety man-
agement systems: (i) the results-based approach, (ii) the compliance-based approach 
and (iii) the process-based approach.  
The results-based approach consists of looking at safety results obtained by the com-
pany over the past years to assess if the safety management system put into place is ef-
fective or not (accident frequency rate, injuries, incidents, near-misses, occupational 
diseases, etc). This approach is widely used because it is easy to implement, not too 
time- or cost-consuming for managers and finally because it is requested by regulation. 
However, it does not assess the operational nor structural aspects of the SMS whatso-
ever. Discussing the many other issues involved in such a safety approach falls outside 
the scope of this paper but examples of such limits can be found in Booth (Booth, 
1993), O’Brien (O’Brien, 2000), Roy et al. (Roy et al., 2004); Stricoff, (Stricoff, 2000), 
Shaw & Blewett, (Shaw & Blewett, 1995). 
The compliance-based approach is the classical way of measuring effectiveness of SMS 
put into place. It consists in auditing the degree of compliance of the SMS with the ex-
isting safety management standards (e.g. OHSAS 18001, ILO-OSH 2001, etc). This ap-
proach is often appealing for many managers as it can easily give a “facade” of per-
formance as well as a “recognized” performance (e.g. OHSAS accreditation). However 
SMS audits focus on the “structural” side of SMS, on the formal description of all the 
efforts that the company has put into managing safety. Despite some visits and inspec-
tions in the different work areas, the SMS audits do not fully address the way the sys-
tem influences the working environment of people and the organizational conditions of 
work.  
The process-based approach measures the performance of each management processes 
(SMP) that constitutes the SMS independently (policy, communication, safety program, 
hazard identification, legal requirements, etc) and gives the overall level of organiza-
tion’s effectiveness in safety management (e.g. International Safety Rating System 
(ISRS)). Through interviews with management or operational staff from the company, 
this approach intends to assess if the safety management system put into place is actu-
ally resilient, if this system is embraced within the organizational practices. The priority 
of the process-based approach is the “operational” performance of the SMS while 
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This short review emphasizes the fact that the current approaches seem quite limited to 
measure both the structural and operational performance of SMS in a combined way. 
With regard to the limits of the current approaches, a double approach is proposed to 
assess the global performance of safety management systems. The prescribed system 
(i.e. the structural performance) is proposed to be measured according to a documentary 
review of the system as it is carried out in the traditional compliance-based approach 
via safety management audits.  
Measuring the operational performance of management systems is a bit more problem-
atic and constitutes the central idea of this paper. Authors of this paper believe that this 
aspect of the SMS performance can be measured using the organizational factors engi-
neering.  
Indeed, many works and models have been developed over the past decades and have 
helped to enrich our capacity to analyse the influence of organization on the safety in 
the workplace. These models have led to the formalisation of several methods aimed at 
assessing organizational weaknesses of sociotechnical systems. In the context of assess-
ing the gaps in between SMS rules and their operational implementation, it seems more 
than relevant to refer to these methods.  
2  TRIPOD AS A META-INSTRUMENT TO ASSESS OPERATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE OF SMS  
In order to choose the most relevant method for measuring the operational performance 
of SMS, different tools identified in the literature were compared with each other. A set 
of 21 methods dealing with organisational factors was initially identified. The next - and 
more challenging - step was to assess the relevance of each method with regard to 
measuring operational performance of SMS.  
The comparison of each method was made using different criteria such as the accuracy 
and coverage of the model, the model of resilience proposed, the coverage of the tool 
with regard to the different processes in SMS, the level of expertise required, the ability 
of the method to take into account the specificities of the plant, the time or cost-
consuming requirements, the validation of the method, etc. From this review and taking 
into account the different criteria chosen, Tripod Delta has emerged as being the most 
appropriate method for measuring operational performance (Cambon et al., 2006).  
2.1 Tripod theory  
The Tripod theory and methodology was developed at Leiden and Manchester Universi-
ties. It originated from a research program investigating ways of preventing human er-
ror initiated by the Dutch Royal/Shell Group in 1986. The project resulted in an instru-
ment that is now widely applied (Groeneweg, 1998).  
Tripod is based upon the principle that the most effective way to prevent human error is 
to control the working environment. It aims at analyzing and controlling the environ-
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mental conditions, the ‘latent failures’ (Reason, 1990) that cause human error. Latent, 
because they are present a long time before a specific substandard act or an accident 
occurs and remain hidden without a specific local trigger. According to the Tripod phi-
losophy, these latent failures can be categorized in a limited number of ways, the Basic 
Risk Factors (Table 1). The BRFs are the result of brainstorming, audit report studies, 
accident scenario inquiries and have shown through extensive field studies to be valid 
for all industrial applications (Groeneweg, 2002).  
All of these BRFs can contribute to accidents in subtle ways, by allowing the develop-
ment of undesirable combinations of situations and acts together (psychological precur-
sors leading to one (or more) substandard act(s) and operational disturbance in the 
working environment), by increasing the chance that ‘sharp end’ individuals will com-
mit substandard acts and by failing to provide the means to protect from accidents al-
ready in progress. Ten of these BRFs influence the process leading to the operational 
disturbances (‘Prevention’ BRFs) and one BRF is aimed at controlling the conse-
quences once the operational disturbance has occurred (The BRF ‘Defences’). This 
BRF is related to all the protective barriers put in place in the system. A more complete 
description of the propagation of the BRFs influences through the organizational system 
is given in Groeneweg (Groeneweg, 2002).  
Table 1. The eleven Basic Risk Factors in Tripod theory ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
10 Prevention BRFs 
- Design (DE): ergonomically poor design of tools or equipment   
- Hardware (HW): poor quality, condition, suitability or availability of materials, tools and equipments 
- Maintenance (MM): no or inadequate performance of maintenance tasks and repairs, bad planning 
- Housekeeping (HK): no or insufficient attention given to keeping the work floor clean and tidied up  
- Error Enforcing Conditions (EC): unsuitable physical conditions (cold, heat, noise, darkness, etc ) or 
personal factors (motivation, boredom, stress, complacency, etc) influencing human functioning 
- Procedures (PR): insufficient quality or availability of procedures, manuals and written instructions 
- Training (TR): inadequate planning, ineffectiveness of trainings, insufficient competence or experience 
of personnel 
- Communication (CO): ineffective communication between sites, departments, individuals 
- Incompatible Goals (IG): unsuitable situations in which people must choose between optimal working 
methods on one hand and the pursuit of production, financial, social or individual goals on the other 
one 
- Organization (OR): shortcomings in the organizational structure, organization’s philosophy, manage-
ment strategies ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Mitigation BRF 
- Defences (DF): insufficient protection of people, material and environment against the consequences of 
operational disturbance    ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
2.2 The concept of organizational resilience in Tripod theory 
In Tripod theory, safety is defined as an equilibrium between substandard acts and 
compensating factors so that unwanted operational disturbances cannot occur. The 
metaphore of a marble on a rough plateau illustrates this equilibrium (Figure 2). When 
the marble stays on the plateau the situation is safe: this situation happens when there is 
no operational disturbance. If the marble starts to move and gets pushed either way over 
the edge of the plateau, an event will happen (an accident or an incident). The chance of 
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having an incident is much higher than having an accident, but is not part of the present 
discussion. 
This model, first introduced by Kletz (Kletz, 1989) and further developed by Gro-
eneweg (Groeneweg, 2002) has a few axioms, such as (i) it is impossible to predict the 
direction of the marble (nobody can predict if something will become an accident or an 
incident), (ii) external forces influence the way the marble rolls (the model recognizes 
that the marble rolls according to operational disturbances coming from the working 
environment),(iii) the surface of the plateau is rough and allows small resistance against 
the movement of the marble, (iv) obstacles (ie. safety barriers) can be placed on the pla-
teau to prevent the marble from dropping off (v) however these obstacles are not effec-
tive all the time, can be sometimes too weak or even missing, etc.  
 
Fig. 2. A marble on a rough plateau 
 
In this theory, the mechanism of a BRF is twofold: it generates substandard acts or 
situations (ie. it makes the marble roll) and it influences the resilience of the organiza-
tion (i.e. it makes the plateau easier to drop from, the marble slides more easily). Influ-
ences of BRFs are shown in figure 3. According to Tripod theory, preventing individual 
substandard acts themselves, setting the right barriers at the right place are of course 
essential but hardly controllable. What is controllable on the other hand is the overall 
state of the organization, the shape of the plateau. The shape of the plateau symbolizes 
how resilient the organization is against operational disturbances.  
 
Fig. 3. Influences of the Basic Risk Factors 
 
In this model, resilient organizations are organizations able to self-recover after distur-
bances occur. Resilience is represented by a stable equilibrium (Figure 4a). After an op-
erational disturbance, the marble has been put in motion but returns automatically to the 
initial, safe state. It does not mean that the situation is inherently absolutely safe as it is 
still possible for the marble to leave the plateau (in cases of extremely large external 
influences) as well as it is possible for ‘good’ companies to produce accidents. How-
ever, in this stable equilibrium, organizations can return to the initial and safe state. On 
the other hand, in non-resilient organizations, the initial safe state cannot be reached 
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dropping the marble in one of the baskets is much greater after the marble was set in 
motion. The marble gains momentum after leaving the safe area and will not return to 
the initial state.  
 
2.3. From the theory to the practice: mains principles of Tripod Delta Survey 
Tripod theory and the safety equilibrium model have served as basic concepts for a 
methodological tool to measure the soundness of organizations in terms of safety. This 
tool is called the Tripod Delta Survey and is designed to detect weak areas in the envi-
ronment in which people are working and the level of control that this organization has 
on processes. The survey uses questions to anonymously collect data relating to factual 
verifiable operational experiences. The questions are designed in such a way that they 
make it possible for the participants to establish a direct link between the question and 
their own knowledge or observation of the system and their actual practices within it 
(e.g. for BRF ‘Procedures’: During the past four weeks, did you have to work with pro-
cedures with conflicting information?). The questions have been gathered in a central 
question database (the “Delta Base”) enclosing around 1,500 validated questions.  
2.4 Tripod as an input for the measurement of operational performance of SMS 
The capacity of Tripod to detect the consequences of Basic Risk Factors, i.e. weak areas 
in the working environment of people appears very relevant when measuring the opera-
tional performance of the SMS put in place by the company. As a matter of fact, the or-
ganizational weaknesses (or strengths) as observed and stressed by all the members of a 
company give a good picture of where the main operational weaknesses (or strengths) 
of its safety management system are. For instance, the Tripod question “Are the man-
agement’s statements in line with their actions?” is a good indicator for measuring if the 
management is really involved and committed in its OH&S policy. 
A tool was then designed on the basis of the assumption that the findings from a Tripod 
Delta Survey can be used as indicators of the operational performance of the company’s 
SMS (Figure 5). The tool integrates 14 SMPs as the main components of the Safety 
Management System and interconnects them with the Tripod questions (categorized in 
11 BRFs). For each of these SMPs, the Tripod questions considered as quite good, good 
or very good indicators were identified and selected from the Tripod Delta Base. All 
together the Tripod Delta Base includes around 1,500 questions. Approximately 70% of 
them (i.e. 900 Tripod questions) are assessed as good or very good indicators for meas-
uring the SMS operational performance. Some BRFs (such as BRF Training or Com-
Accident Incident 
Fig. 4a. The stable equilibrium  
of resilient organizations 
Fig. 4b. The unstable equilibrium  
of non-resilient organizations 
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munication) have a direct corresponding SMP (3.1 Training, competence and specific 
trainings, 3.2 Consultation, communication, information of employees). Most of the 
BRFs cover several SMPs. For instance, the BRF ‘Organization’ provides good indica-
tors for the SMP ‘OH&S policy and commitment of management’, ‘OH&S objectives 
and management program’, ‘Role and responsibilities of employees’, or ‘Consultation, 
communication, information of employees’. The SMP ‘Management of safety in activi-
ties’, qualified by SMS auditors as being the most time-consuming and most difficult 
section to evaluate, is covered by more than 300 Tripod questions. 
 
Fig. 5. Tripod as an input for the measurement of SMS operational performance 
3 PRESENTATION OF THE TOOLS DEVELOPPED FOR MEASURING 
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
According to the two dimensions involved in the Safety Management System, two tools 
have been designed in order to measure its ‘structural’ and ‘operational’ performance.  
3.1 Principles of the tools designed  
The tool designed for measuring the ‘structural’ performance is based upon existing 
Safety Management standards (OHSAS 18001, ILO-OSH 2001 and MASE). It involves 
a checklist to help the auditor to assess through a documentary review and interviews if 
the structure of the SMS (procedures, policies, programs, etc) has been efficiently for-
malized by the company and if it complies with the standards requirements. The tool 
developed is based upon 230 ‘structural’ indicators (Table 2 presents five of them). It 
can be used as an inventory assessment when the company is willing to build its own 
SMS (the tool gives an indication of what is done and what needs to be done in terms of 
structure) and can be used also as a diagnostic of the SMS before an audit of accredita-
tion. This tool is currently being experimented on two French pilot plants.  
Table 2. Example of structural indicators for the OH&S policy (§4.2 in OHSAS 18001, §3.1 in ILO-
OSH2001 
OH&S Policy and commitment of management 
1 Has the management established an OH&S policy? 
2 Is the OH&S policy appropriate and adapted to the organization? 
3 Is the OH&S policy dated and regularly updated? 
4 Is the OH&S policy signed by the organization’s corporate management? 





Measure of SMS  
operational performance 
Findings from  
Tripod Delta Survey 
14 safety management 
processes (SMPs) 
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The tool designed for measuring the ‘operational’ performance uses Tripod as an input. 
A Tripod Delta survey needs to be carried out in the company before its complete im-
plementation (Figure 5). The tool assesses the influence of the SMS on the working en-
vironment and practices through the experience and observation of people. The tool de-
veloped is based upon 90 ‘operational’ indicators. Each of these indicators refers to 
several Tripod questions. For example, in Table 3, the first ‘operational indicator’ re-
lated to the real involvement and commitment of the management in its OH&S policy 
can be assessed with 10 Tripod questions. This tool is currently in the experimentation 
stage in one French pilot plant (also pilot plant for Tripod Delta and for the implementa-
tion of the tool measuring the SMS structural performance). 
Table 3. Example of operational indicators for the OH&S policy (§4.2 in OHSAS 18001, §3.1 in ILO-
OSH2001 
OH&S Policy and commitment of management 
1 In practice, is the management really involved and committed into its OH&S policy?  
2 Does the management give sufficient resources (financial, human and time) for the implementation and application of its OH&S policy?  
3 Is this OH&S policy really known and understood by employees?  
…  
3.2 Next stage: integrating the results  
The two tools developed provide an assessment of the level of compliance of the com-
pany’s SMS with the existing safety management standards as well as an assessment of 
its influence on the working environment and peoples’ working practices. The results of 
these two assessments can be represented on the same graph as shown in Figure 6. The 
integration of results is possible as the same measurement criteria have been chosen for 
the two assessments (the overall SMS has been divided into 14 safety management 












1.1 OH&S policy and commitment of management
1.2 OH&S objectives and management program
2.1 Role and responsibilities of employees, organisational
structure 
2.2 Legal and other requirements and regulatory
surveillance
2.3 Hazard identif ication and risk management
3.1 Training, competence and specif ic trainings
3.2 Consultation, communication, information of
employees
3.3 Documentation, OH&S manual and document control
3.4 Management of safety in activities 
3.5 Emergency preparedness and response
4.1 OH&S performance measurement and medical
surveillance 
4.2 Audits, controls, inspections, checks
4.3 Analysis of incidents, accidents, injuries. Corrective
actions 
5.1 Continuous improvement, management review
Structural performance Operational performance
 
Fig 6. Example of structural and operational performances of a Safety Management System 
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Figure 6 is an example of results obtained for a virtual SMS. The integration stage of 
the two assessments has not been reached yet as the two different tools are currently in 
the experimentation stage. The discontinuous line represents the structural performance 
of the virtual SMS put into place and the continuous line its operational performance. 
The graph can be used as a support to analyze (i) the safety processes poorly formalized 
(e.g. processes n° 2.2 and 3.5), (ii) the safety processes with low effectiveness on peo-
ple’s working environment (e.g. processes n°1.1, 1.2 and 3.5) as well as (iii) the signifi-
cant gaps between the system on ‘paper’ and the system’s real influence on people’s 
working environment (e.g. processes 5.1, 4.1, 3.4, 1.2).  
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